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IMITATION MAY NOT ALWAYS 
BE THE SINCEREST FORM OF 
FLATTERY: WHY COLOR WARS 
IN THE UNITED STATES AND 
EUROPE MAY RESULT IN 
BRAND DILUTION AND COLOR 
DEPLETION 
Taylor Piscionere* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“There is a difference between imitating a good man and 
counterfeiting him.”1 
The United States and the European Union have long rec-
ognized trademarks as an important component of intellectual 
property law and commerce.  The main purposes of trademark 
law are to protect the public from confusion regarding the 
sources of goods and services and to protect businesses from 
the dilution of their brands through misrepresentation or mis-
appropriation of one another.2  
A trademark in the United States is understood as a dis-
tinctive mark, symbol, or emblem utilized by a manufacturer to 
identify and distinguish his particular goods from those of oth-
ers.3  The statutory definition of a “trademark” is found in the 
                                            
*JD Pace University School of Law 2013, served as Editor-in-Chief of 
Pace International Law Review.  I owe special thanks to my parents, Jeryl 
and Tony, my sister, Alex, and my boyfriend, Michael.  Thank you for your 
love and support throughout my law school journey. Thank you to the Pace 
International Law Review Editorial Board, Senior Associates, and Junior As-
sociates. Special thanks to Managing Editor Adam Kusovitsky, without 
whom this publication would not have been possible.  
1 Benjamin Franklin Quotes and Quotations, FAMOUS QUOTES & 
AUTHORS, http://www.famousquotesandauthors.com/topics/imitation_quotes. 
html (last visited Jan. 3, 2012). 
2 Overview of Trademark Law, BERKMAN CENTER FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, 
http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/metaschool/fisher/domain/tm.htm (last visited 
Feb. 26, 2012). 
3 Id.  
1
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Lanham Act, a collection of federal statutes that govern United 
States trademark law.  According to 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127,   
The term “trademark” includes any word, name, symbol, or de-
vice, or any combination thereof—(1) used by a person, or (2) 
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and 
applies to register on the principal register established by this 
chapter, to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a 
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to 
indicate the source of the goods, even if that source is unknown.4 
Although the aforementioned statute seems to include a 
broad range of goods and services, there are exceptions that are 
not allotted trademark protection.  One such exception is that 
of a “functional design.”  Functional designs can never acquire 
trademark protection since the interest in avoiding confusion is 
outweighed by unfair competition strategies.5  The Restate-
ment (Third) of Unfair Competition states, “A design is func-
tional because of its aesthetic value only if it confers a signifi-
cant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated by the use of 
alternative designs.”6  In other words, the mark cannot serve 
any other significant function apart from distinguishing a 
firm’s goods and identifying its source.7 
Articles four through five of the European Union’s Council 
Regulation defines community trademarks (as they are termed 
in the European Union) as:  
Any signs capable of being represented graphically (particularly 
words, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their 
packaging) provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing 
the goods or services of one undertaking from those of other un-
dertakings. 
The following natural or legal persons, including authorities es-
tablished under public law, may be proprietors of Community 
trade marks: 
(a) nationals of the Member States; or 
(b) nationals of other States which are parties to the Paris 
                                            
4 15 U.S.C.A. § 1127 (West 2012) (defining terms used in the Lanham 
Act). 
5 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 (1995). 
6 Id. 
7 Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc., 514 U.S. 159, 166 (1995). 
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/2
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Convention8 for the protection of industrial property . . . ; or 
(c) nationals of States which are not parties to the Paris Con-
vention who are domiciled or have their seat . . . within the ter-
ritory of the Community or of a State which is party to the Par-
is Convention; 
(d) nationals . . . of any State which is not party to the Paris 
Convention and which, according to published findings, accords 
to nationals of all the Member States the same protection for 
trade marks as it accords to its own nationals and, if nationals 
of the Member States are required to prove registration in the 
country of origin, recognizes the registration of Community 
trade marks as such proof.9 
Excluded from the Council’s regulations are signs that are 
not suitable to serve as trademarks; trademarks which are de-
void of any distinctive character; trademarks consisting of 
signs or indications that have become customary in current 
parlance or commercial practice; trademarks which are contra-
ry to public policy or to accepted principles of morality; and 
trademarks which are of such a nature as to deceive the public, 
as to the nature, quality, or geographical origin of the goods or 
service.10  The Office for Harmonization in the Internal Market 
(OHIM) regulates the trademarks that are registered in the 
European Union under this statute and their legality is over-
seen by The Court of Justice of the European Union.11   
Both the United States and the European Union have re-
cently recognized nontraditional marks in keeping with modern 
marketing and branding.  Companies now employ branding 
techniques that utilize nontraditional marks to distinguish 
their products.12  Among the most popular are color, sound, and 
                                            
8 Union created to protect industrial property (including trademarks) of 
members of the treaty. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial 
Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
9 Council Regulation 40/94, arts. 4-5, 1993 O.J. (L 011) (EC) [hereinafter 
Council Regulation 40/94]. 
10 Id. 
11 See Manual of Trademark Practice, OFF. FOR HARMONIZATION IN THE 
INTERNAL MARKET (Nov. 12, 2012), http://oami.europa.eu/ows/rw/pages/CTM/ 
legalReferences/guidelines/OHIMManual.en.do. 
12 Melissa E. Roth, Something Old, Something New, Something Bor-
rowed, Something Blue: A New Tradition in Nontraditional Trademark Reg-
istrations, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 457, 458 (2005). 
3
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even scent.13  The Lanham Act now includes provisions for pro-
tection of color trademarks, provided that color has acquired a 
secondary meaning.14  The European Union, through case law 
and recent treaties, has also recognized color as an integral 
part of trademark law.15 
This comment will focus on the way in which courts in the 
United States and the European Union have navigated the 
nontraditional waters of the relevant intellectual property 
statutes through their statutory interpretations, knowledge of 
common business administration, and their understanding of 
commerce.  More specifically, this comment will focus on color 
trademarks, the threat of dilution, and how United States and 
European Union laws on this topic interact. 
II. TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION UNDER THE 
LANHAM ACT 
The Lanham Act codifies United States trademark law and 
further imposes restrictions on the types of subject matter eli-
gible for trademark registration and protection.  The Act al-
ways requires that the mark be distinctive in order to be af-
forded such protections.16  This requirement may be satisfied 
by showing that the mark is (1) inherently distinctive, or has 
acquired distinctiveness through secondary meaning and (2) is 
not functional.17  Registering one’s trademark provides con-
structive notice and protects registrant’s interests by prevent-
ing misappropriation of the mark.18  However, misappropria-
tion occurs often, and when faced with such situations, the 
courts must decide if (1) the mark merits protection and (2) the 
infringer’s use of the same or sufficiently similar mark is likely 
                                            
13 See id. at 460. 
14 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125. 
15 See Council Regulation 40/94, supra note 9.  
16 Diane E. Moir, Trademark Protection of Color Alone: How and When 
Does a Color Develop Secondary Meaning and Why Color Marks Can Never 
Be Inherently Distinctive, 27 TOURO L. REV. 407, 409 (2011). 
17 See id. 
18 In re Int’l Flavors & Fragrances, 183 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 1999) 
(“Registration serves as constructive notice to the public of the registrant’s 
ownership of the mark, see 15 U.S.C. § 1072 (1946), and thus prevents anoth-
er user of the mark from claiming innocent misappropriation as a trademark 
infringement defense”) (citation omitted).  
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/2
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to cause consumer confusion as to the origin or sponsorship of 
the infringer’s product.19  The first question directly deals with 
the statutory definition of a trademark.20  A court begins its 
analysis with the statutory presumption that the trademark is 
valid.21  That presumption of validity may be rebutted.22 
Regarding color, the seminal trademark case in the United 
States is Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., Inc.23 Before 
the Court, the issue was whether the Lanham Act permitted 
the registration of a specific shade of green as a trademark.24  
In Qualitex, the dry cleaning firm Qualitex registered the 
green-gold color it used on its press pads as a trademark.25  Ja-
cobson Products, a Qualitex competitor and defendant in this 
matter, began manufacturing and distributing an inferior qual-
ity press pad in a very similar green-gold color, albeit before 
Qualitex registered its mark.26  In deciding whether or not 
trademark law should extend to color alone, the court analyzed 
the narrow issues of shade confusion and color depletion.27 
Defendant Jacobson’s main argument was that if the law 
permits a brand to trademark a color, it would produce irre-
solvable court disputes about which shade of color a competitor 
may use.28  Since lighting affects perceptions of color, competi-
tors and courts would suffer from “shade confusion” in their 
analysis of whether the competitor color is too similar and 
thereby confuses consumers.29  The Qualitex court opined that 
courts have to make difficult determinations about sufficiently 
similar words, phrases, and symbols, which is no different than 
                                            
19 See Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe's Borough Coffee, Inc., 588 F.3d 97, 114 
(2d Cir. 2009); 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a). 
20 See 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
21 See 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b); Lane Capital Mgmt., Inc. v. Lane Capital 
Mgmt., Inc., 192 F. 3d 337, 345 (2d Cir. 1999). 
22 See Lane Capital Mgmt., 192 F.3d at 345.   
23 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 159. 
24 See id. at 161. 
25 Jean Hayes Kearns, Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co.: Orange 
You Sorry The Supreme Court Protected Color?, 70 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 337, 
338 (1996). 
26 Id. at 159. 
27 Id. at 167, 169. 
28 Id. at 167. 
29 Id. 
5
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determining whether two colors are sufficiently similar.30  
“‘[S]trong’ marks, with greater secondary meaning, receive 
broader protection than ‘weak’ marks.”31  The Court did not see 
why it would not be able to replicate lighting conditions under 
which a product is normally sold, if necessary, to aid in its de-
termination.32 
Jacobson’s second argument concerned color depletion, 
claiming that color supply is limited and a competitor’s inabil-
ity to find a suitable color would put that competitor at a signif-
icant disadvantage.33  The Qualitex court was not persuaded by 
this argument, stating, “It relies on an occasional problem to 
justify a blanket prohibition.  When a color serves as a mark, 
normally alternative colors will likely be available for similar 
use by others.”34  This scarcity issue is defeated by the doctrine 
of “functionality,” which prevents anti-competitive consequenc-
es that defendant’s argument posits, thereby minimizing the 
argument’s practical force.35  The functionality doctrine forbids 
a product’s feature from being trademarked where the feature 
is “essential to the use or purpose of the article” or “affects its 
cost or quality,” thereby putting the competitor at a disad-
vantage.36  The Qualitex court, therefore, concluded that the 
functionality doctrine deters interference with current legiti-
mate competition and potentially future competition.37 
Jacobson further attempted to point to older cases in sup-
port of its position, which prohibited trademark protection for 
color alone.38  Since these cases interpreted trademark law be-
                                            
30 Id. 
31 Id. 
32 Id. at 168. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. at 169. 
36 Id. at 165. If functional features could be trademarked, the company 
holding the trademark could perpetually prevent competitors from using that 
feature in their own products and effectively, free market competition would 
thereby be hindered. See Kearns, supra note 25, at 338-39. 
37 See Qualitex, 514 U.S at 169. 
38 Coca–Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America, 254 U.S. 143, 147 (1920); A. 
Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick & Bascom Rope Co., 201 U.S. 166, 171 
(1906); McLean v. Fleming, 96 U.S. 245, 254 (1877); Life Savers Corp. v. 
Curtiss Candy Co., 182 F.2d 4, 8 (7th Cir. 1950) (holding that colors are not 
protectable under trademark law). 
6http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/2
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fore 1946, when Congress enacted the Lanham Act, Jacobson’s 
argument held no merit in the modern courtroom.39  The Lan-
ham Act extended protection to descriptive marks by making 
clear that “nothing . . . shall prevent the registration of a mark 
used by the applicant which has become distinctive of the ap-
plicant’s goods in commerce.”40  The language in this statute al-
lows ordinary words normally used for a non-trademark pur-
pose to act as a trademark where it has garnered a secondary 
meaning, so it would logically follow that the statute applies to 
colors as well.41   
Jacobson finally argued that color alone does not need 
trademark protection because it is already protected as “trade 
dress,” or use of a color as part of a trademark.42  The Court re-
jected this argument finding, in many instances, a firm may 
want to use a color, “pure and simple,” instead of color as part 
of a design.43  In addition, the Court posited that trademark 
law protects the holder of the mark in many ways that “trade 
dress” protection cannot; thus, the law provides trade dress 
protection in addition to trademark protection, not in lieu of 
trademark protection.44 
In summary, the Qualitex court held that “color alone, at 
least sometimes, can meet the basic legal requirements for use 
as a trademark. It can act as a symbol that distinguishes a 
firm’s goods and identifies their source, without serving any 
other significant function.”45  When “color is not essential to a 
product’s use or purpose and does not affect cost or quality . . . 
the doctrine of ‘functionality’ does not create an absolute bar to 
the use of color alone as a mark.”46  This decision was the first 
of its kind to carve out an opening in the Lanham Act for color 
trademarks and prompted other courts to consider other non-
traditional marks such as sound47 and smell.48   
                                            
39 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 171. 
40 15 U.S.C. 1052(f) (West 2012).   
41 See Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 171-72. 
42 Id. at 173. 
43 Id. at 174. 
44 See id. (addressing the ability to prevent importation of confusingly 
similar goods). 
45 Id. at 166. 
46 Id. at 165. 
47 Roth, supra note 12, at 457. 
7
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Although Qualitex blazed the yellow brick road of color 
trademark recognition, one modern case reminds us that the 
Qualitex holding is not infallible.49  In the most recent color 
trademark case decided by the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Second Circuit, Christian Louboutin v. Yves Saint Lau-
rent Christian, Louboutin sued Yves Saint Laurent (YSL) for 
trademark infringement and unfair competition under the 
Lanham Act.50  YSL asserted various counterclaims, seeking 
cancellation of Louboutin’s trademark registration and damag-
es.51  Louboutin cleverly colored the outsoles of his shoes a 
glossy, vivid red, deviating from the industry custom to give his 
line of shoes “energy.”52  He chose a shade of red because he re-
garded it as “engaging, flirtatious, memorable, and the color of 
passion,” as well as “sexy.”53  The fashion industry responded to 
his bold divergence from the market and Louboutin now com-
mands up to $1,000 a pair.54  The United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) approved registration of these red 
soles (Red Sole Mark).55  
Louboutin claimed that YSL, a fashion house, infringed on 
his trademark by using the same or a confusingly similar shade 
of red protected by the Red Sole Mark in its 2011 collection.56  
“Each of the challenged models bears a bright red outsole as 
part of a monochromatic design in which the shoe is entirely 
red.”57  To succeed in its claims under the Lanham Act, 
Louboutin had to demonstrate that (1) its Red Sole Mark mer-
its protection; and (2) YSL’s use of the same or a sufficiently 
similar mark is likely to cause consumer confusion as to the 
origin or sponsorship of YSL’s shoes.58   
                                                                                                  
48 Id. 
49 See generally Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am. 
Holdings, Inc., 696 F.3d 206, 212 (2d Cir. 2012). 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 214. 
52 See id. at 211. 
53 Christian Louboutin S.A. v. Yves Saint Laurent Am., Inc., 778 F. Supp. 
2d 445, 447 (S.D.N.Y. 2011), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 696 F.3d 206 (2d Cir. 
2012). 
54 Id. at 448. 
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 449. 
57 Id. 
58 Id. at 450 (citation omitted). 
8http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/2
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Using the aforementioned definition of a trademark,59 the 
Second Circuit had to decide the narrow issue of whether the 
Lanham Act extends trademark protection to a single color 
used as “an expressive and defining quality of an article of 
wear produced in the fashion industry.”60  The district court’s 
whimsical analysis recognized the art of fashion, aesthetics, 
and creativity, and not just as products created to serve a 
commercial purpose.61 
Louboutin himself would probably feel his sense of honneur 
wounded if he were considered merely a cobbler, rather than an 
artiste . . . . Color constitutes a critical attribute of the goods each 
form designs. [C]olor depicts elemental properties. As it projects 
expression of the artist's mental world, it captures the mutabil-
ity, the fancy, the moods of the visual world, in both spheres 
working as a means to execute singular concepts born of imagi-
nation for which not just any other shade will do. Hence, color in 
this context plays a unique role. It is a feature purposely given to 
an article of art or design to depict the idea as the creator con-
ceived it, and to evoke an effect intended. In ornamenting, it 
draws attention to itself, and to the object for which its tone 
forms a distinct expressive feature. From these perspectives, col-
or in turn elementally performs a creative function; it aims to 
please or be useful, not to identify and advertise a commercial 
source.62  
Color, according to the district court, is the most crucial 
feature to fashion design, where every pigment of the spectrum 
is freely available for the creator to apply.63  The contrary, 
therefore, also applies.  Allowing one artist to appropriate an 
entire shade and thus inhibiting ambiguous shades that may 
look like the appropriated shade “would unduly hinder not just 
commerce and competition, but art as well.”64  The court felt 
that the law should not condone such restraints that would in-
                                            
59 “Any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof . . . [,] 
which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and applies to 
register . . . , to identify and distinguish his or her goods . . .  from those man-
ufactured and sold by others and to indicate the source of the goods.”  Id. (cit-
ing 15 U.S.C. § 1127). 
60 Id. at 451. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. at 452-53 
63 Id. at 453. 
64 Id. 
9
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terfere with creativity and stifle competition by granting a mo-
nopoly of color to one designer engaged in the same trade or 
business.65  
The next question of functionality is paramount to the dis-
cussion of whether a single color in the fashion industry can 
constitute a valid mark.66  As outlined in Qualitex, the func-
tionality doctrine determines whether or not a product’s fea-
ture may be trademarked.67  Use of a single color has been held 
functional in prior cases and is therefore, not protectable under 
the Lanham Act.68  The district court opined that even though 
the outsole of a shoe is a pedestrian and functional aspect, 
when coated in a bright and unexpected color in order to at-
tract, stand out, or decorate, these attributes become non-
trademark functions of color in fashion.69   
The color red and the lacquered red sole, two components 
of the mark, are serious threats to legitimate competition in 
the designer shoe market, according.70  Louboutin’s claim to 
“the color red” is overly broad and inconsistent with the pur-
pose and scheme of the Lanham Act’s trademark registration.71  
The southern district reasoned that granting a monopoly to one 
participant in the shoe market would be damaging to other de-
signers who wish to express their creative and artistic work.72  
If red were the primary color of the new season, Louboutin’s 
                                            
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 453 (citing Qualitex, 514 U.S. at 169) (“The functionality doc-
trine…forbids the use of a product’s feature as a trademark where doing so 
would put a competitor at a significant disadvantage because the feature is 
‘essential to the use or purpose of the article’ or ‘affects [its] cost or quality.’”) 
68 Id.; see, e.g., Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd., 35 F.3d 1527, 
1533 (Fed. Cir. 1994) (black for marine outboard engines held functional be-
cause it is “compatib[le] with a wide variety of boat colors and [can] make ob-
jects appear smaller”); Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc.,, 560 F. Supp. 85, 98 
(S.D. Iowa 1982) (green for farm equipment held functional because farmers 
“prefer to match their loaders to their tractor”), aff'd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 
1983). 
69 Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. 2d at 454. 
70 See id. (describing whether or not “granting the trademark rights for 
Louboutin’s brand would ‘significantly hinder competition,’ that is, ‘permit 
one competitor (or a group) to interfere with legitimate (non-trademark relat-
ed) competition through actual or potential exclusive use of an important 
product ingredient’”). 
71 See id. 
72 Id. 
10http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pilr/vol25/iss1/2
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claim would cast a cloud over the entire industry, hindering 
other designers while allowing Louboutin a full palate from 
which to work.73  Competitors attempting to examine which 
color is actually registered by Louboutin would, therefore, be 
unable to precisely identify which shade is available for use or 
one that is confusingly too close.74  This uncertainty may very 
well breed a specter of fashion wars that courts will have to 
referee and set a bright line rule that will continuously be 
crossed and drawn again.75 
Luckily, the Second Circuit cured the Southern District’s 
incorrect decision, as it was in direct conflict with the Qualitex 
decision, holding: 
[T]he District Court's conclusion that a single color can never 
serve as a trademark in the fashion industry was based on an in-
correct understanding of the doctrine of aesthetic functionality 
and was therefore error. We further hold that the District Court's 
holding, that Louboutin's trademark has developed “secondary 
meaning” in the public eye, was firmly rooted in the evidence of 
record and was not clearly erroneous, and that the Red Sole 
Mark is therefore a valid and enforceable trademark. We limit 
the Red Sole Mark pursuant to Section 37 of the Lanham Act, 15 
U.S.C. § 1119, to a red lacquered outsole that contrasts with the 
color of the adjoining “upper.”76 
II. TRADEMARK AND UNFAIR COMPETITION UNDER EUROPEAN 
LAW 
Trademark laws in the European Union are relatively 
young and therefore less centralized than those in the United 
States.  There are two initiatives that combine to form Europe-
an Union Trademark Law: the First Council Directive (The 
1998 Directive),77 which requires European Union Member 
States78 to adapt or “harmonize” their trademark laws,79 and 
                                            
73 Id. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. at 457. 
76 Louboutin, 696 F.3d at 228.   
77 Roth, supra note 12, at 465 (citing Luis-Alfonso Duran, The New Eu-
ropean Trademark Law, 23 DENV. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 489, 499 (1995)).   
78 Twenty-seven member countries or states make up the European Un-
ion: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithua-
11
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the Community Trade Mark Regulation.80   
To receive protection under the 1998 Directive, a design 
must be new and have individual character.81  A design is con-
sidered new if “no identical design has been made available to 
the public” prior to the application’s filing date and has indi-
vidual character if the “overall impression” on the “informed 
user” differs from any preexisting design.”82  The 1998 Di-
rective “protects the design’s overall appearance as well as any 
part arising from the ‘lines, contours, colours, shape, texture 
and/or materials of the product itself and/or its ornamenta-
tion.’”83  If an article receives protection under this directive, it 
is protected for up to twenty-five years from the filing date.84   
The Community Trademark Regulation imposed a uniform 
trademark system in which a single registration with the 
Community Trade Mark85 grants exclusive protection and 
rights to the trademark holder in all EU countries.86  In 2002, a 
provision was enacted by the European Union Council that 
provided additional rights for designs with the European Regu-
lation on Community Designs (“2002 Regulation”).87  The 2002 
Regulation offers similar protections to those in the 1998 Di-
                                                                                                  
nia, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.  See Countries, 
EUROPA.EU, http://europa.eu/about-eu/countries/index_en.htm (last visited 
Oct. 2012). 
79 Roth, supra note 12, at 465 (discussing the purpose of the Directive to 
synthesize the laws of Member States rather than create a uniform trade-
mark system); see Council Directive 89/104/EEC, 1989 O.J. (L 040) 1 (EC) 
[hereinafter Directive].  The Directive grants Member States authority to leg-
islate on matters such as procedures concerning registration, revocation, in-
validity, and priority. 
80 Roth, supra note 12, at 464. 
81 Sara R. Ellis, Copyrighting Couture: An Examination of Fashion De-
sign Protection and Why the DPPA and the IDPPA Are a Step Towards the 
Solution to Counterfeit Chic 78 TENN. L. REV. 163, 190 (2010) (citing Council 
Directive 98/71, art. 1, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28, 30 (EC), available at 
http://www.ipjur.com/data/981013DIR9871EC.pdf).  
82 Council Directive 98/71, art. 4-5, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28, 30 (EC). 
83 Id. art. 1. 
84 Id. art. 10. 
85 The term “Trade Mark” in the European Union is preferred, while the 
term “trademark” is the standard in the United States.  
86  See, e.g., Vincent O’Reilly, The Community Trademark System: A Brief 
Introduction and Overview, 8 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 93 (2004).  
87 Ellis, supra note 82, at 193 (citations omitted).  
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rective, except it extends protection to unregistered trademarks 
as well as registered designs.88  The 2002 Regulation clarifies 
that since its purpose is to prevent copying, its protections 
would not prohibit works that were born of independent crea-
tion.89  Registered designs under the 2002 Regulation are also 
protected for twenty-five years, but unregistered designs are 
limited to a term of three years.90 
Although “theoretically, in the European Union, any mark, 
including sound, scent, or color mark, is registrable as long as 
it is capable of graphic representation and distinguishes the 
goods or services of one undertaking from the goods or services 
of another,”91 the European Union has just recently recognized 
nontraditional trademarks and still treads cautiously about 
what nontraditional trademarks are registrable.92  Graphic 
representation is not simply a technical requirement for Euro-
pean Union registration, it exemplifies the “principle of preci-
sion.”93  Graphic representation, a vital part of nontraditional 
trademark registration, ensures that the scope and nature of 
the mark are clearly defined and comprehensible so that those 
checking the registry can determine what has already been reg-
istered.94 
The European Court of Justice (ECJ),95 the highest court in 
the European Union, requires that graphic representation 
                                            
88 See Council Directive 98/71, art. 2, 1998 O.J. (L 289) 28, 30 (EC). 
89 Ellis, supra note 82, at 192 (citations omitted). 
90 Id. 
91 Roth, supra note 12, at 466 (citing Case C-283/01, Shield Mark BV v. 
Joost Kist H.O.D.N., 2004 E.T.M.R. 33, ¶¶ 34-41). 
92 The Truth About Trade Marks, MANAGING INTELL. PROP., May 2004, at 
32. Nearly eighty percent of in-house counsel surveyed stated that legal cer-
tainty was a very important aspect of the registration process.  
93 Roth, supra note 12, at 466 (citing Case C-49/02, Heidelberger 
Bauchemie GmbH, 2004 E.T.M.R. 99, ¶ 13). 
94 Id. (citing Sieko Hidaka et al., A Sign of the Times? A Review of Key 
Trade Mark Decisions of the European Court of Justice and Their Impact Up-
on National Trade Mark Jurisprudence in the EU, 94 TRADEMARK REP. 1105, 
1124 (2004); see also Abida Chaudri, Graphically Speaking: Registering 
Smell, Colour and Sound Marks in the UK and Europe, 157 TRADEMARK 
WORLD 26 (May 2003)). 
95 It interprets EU law to ensure that the law is applied uniformly in all 
EU countries. The E.C.J. is made up of twenty-seven judges, one judge per 
EU country.  See Presentation, CVRIA, http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/jcms/Jo2_ 
7024/ (last visited Oct. 2012). 
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must be “clear, precise, self-contained, easily accessible, intelli-
gible, durable and objective.”96  The rationale of the ECJ is to 
enable precise definition of the mark so that the trademark 
holder, consumers, and competitors can ascertain the scope of 
the trademark protection.97  The graphic representation must 
be durable so that the mark is uniform and systematic, which 
will guarantee that the mark is an invariable indication of the 
source.98  Finally, the ECJ requires that the representation be 
unambiguous and objective, ensuring that registration, protec-
tion, and enforcement of the trademark is consistent.99  
The ECJ first addressed the issue of color marks in the 
European Union in Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux-
Merkenbureau.100  In Libertel, the ECJ had to consider a num-
ber of questions relating to the registrability of single color 
marks.101  Libertal was referred to the ECJ by a Dutch court in 
relation to a trademark application for the color orange by 
Libertel.102  The ECJ began its analysis with the legal back-
ground of trademark law in the European Union, citing the 
Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property (“Paris 
Convention”) and the aforementioned Directive.103  According to 
the court, trademark law is governed at the international level 
by the Paris Convention, signed in Paris on March 20, 1883.104  
It was last revised in Stockholm on July 14, 1967.105  All mem-
ber states are signatories to the Convention.106  According to 
the court, Article 6(B)(2) provides that “trademarks may be de-
                                            
96 Roth, supra note 12, at 467. 
97 See id. at 466. See generally Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches 
Patent-und Markenan 2002 E.C.R. I-11737. 
98 Case C-273/00, Sieckmann v. Deutsches Patent-und Markenan 2002 
E.C.R. I-11737, ¶ 53. 
99 Id. ¶ 54. 
100 Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux- Merkenbureau, 2003 
E.C.R. I-03793. 
101 See id. 
102 Id. ¶¶ 1-2. 
103 See id. ¶ 3. 
104 Id.  
105 Id.  
106 Id. There are 174 contracting parties to the Paris Convention. Treaties 
and Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,  http://www.wipo.int 
/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year=ANY&end_year=A
NY&search_what=C&treaty_all=ALL (last visited Dec. 1, 2012). 
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nied registration or invalidated when they are devoid of any 
distinctive character.”107  Moreover, Article 6(C)(1) outlines the 
standard for determining if a mark is protectable: “In deter-
mining whether a mark is eligible for protection, all the factual 
circumstances must be taken into consideration, particularly 
the length of time the mark has been in use.”108   
Although the ECJ outlined the Paris Convention as the 
governing international law, it primarily used Article 2 and Ar-
ticle 6 of the Directive in determining its holding.109  A graphic 
representation within the meaning of Article 2 of the 1988 Di-
rective must enable the sign to be represented visually, partic-
ularly by means of visual images, lines, or characters in order 
to be precisely identified.110  Article 6 of the 1988 Directive con-
cerns the limits on the effects of a trademark once it has been 
registered; even though registration would result in color de-
pletion for competitors, the court believes that the importance 
of trademarks outweighs this issue.111 
                                            
107 Case C-104/01, Libertel Groep BV v. Benelux- Merkenbureau, 2003 
E.C.R. I-03793, ¶ 4  
108 Id. ¶ 5.  
109 Id. Article 2 of the Directive, entitled “Signs of which a trade mark 
may consist,” provides as follows; “A trade mark may consist of any sign ca-
pable of being represented graphically, particularly words, including personal 
names, designs, letters, numerals, the shape of goods or of their packaging, 
provided that such signs are capable of distinguishing the goods or services of 
one undertaking from those of other undertakings.”  
110 See id. ¶ 28.  
111 Id. ¶ 58. Article 6 of the Directive, entitled “Limitations of the effects 
if a trade mark,” provides as follows: 
1. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third 
party from using, in the course of trade, 
(a) his own name or address; 
(b) indications concerning the kind, quality, quantity, intended pur-
pose, value, geographical origin, the time of production of goods or of 
rendering of the service, or other characteristics of goods or 
services; 
(c) the trade mark where it is necessary to indicate the intended 
purpose of a product or service, in particular as accessories or spare 
parts; provided he uses them in accordance with honest practices in 
industrial or commercial matters. 
2. The trade mark shall not entitle the proprietor to prohibit a third 
party from using, in the course of trade, an earlier right which only 
applies in a particular locality if that right is recognized by the laws of 
the Member State in question and within the limits of the territory in 
15
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The court held that “to graphically represent a color mark, 
an applicant must submit a sample or swatch of the color and 
designate the color using an internationally recognized identi-
fication code.”112  The ECJ deemed the use of an internationally 
recognized color code an acceptable graphic representation, 
since it is precise, uniform, and stable.113  A color sample alone 
would be insufficient and a verbal description of the color failed 
to satisfy the requirements of clarity, precision, self-
containment, easy accessibility, intelligibility, and objectivity, 
even though it would technically be a form of graphic represen-
tation.114 
A more recent application of European trademark law can 
be found in Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH.115  In that case, 
the applicant of the color trademark, a company involved in the 
building trade, sought to register the color combination of blue 
and yellow “in every conceivable form.”116  The representation 
of the claimed mark consisted of a rectangle with the top half 
blue and the bottom half yellow and the applicant provided the 
appropriate color codes.117  The ECJ held that the graphic rep-
resentation of color combinations could not be registered unless 
it portrayed the colors in a “systematic arrangement associat-
ing the colours concerned in a predetermined and uniform 
way.”118  This way, it would be easier to determine the source of 
the trademark and the scope of the trademark holder’s 
rights.119  
Such representations would allow numerous different combina-
tions, which would not permit the consumer to perceive and re-
call a particular combination, thereby enabling him to repeat 
                                                                                                  
which it is recognized 
112 Roth, supra note 12, at 477 (citing Id. ¶ 68). An applicant seeking to 
register the color orange, for example, must submit a swatch of the particular 
shade of orange it claims as a trademark and the corresponding color code 
from an internationally recognized color chart, such as a Pantone® Color 
Code, RGB Color Code or RAL Color Code. 
113 See id. 
114 See id. 
115 See Case C-49/02, Heidelberger Bauchemie GmbH, 2004 E.C.R. I-
06129. 
116 Id. ¶ 8. 
117 Id. 
118 Roth, supra note 12, at 477 (citing Id. ¶ 35). 
119 Id.  
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with certainty the experience of a purchase, any more than they 
would allow the competent authorities and economic operators to 
know the scope of the protection afforded to the proprietor of the 
trade mark.120 
Under the Directive, this decision implies that a non-
systematic arrangement of a combination of colors cannot con-
stitute a “sign.”121  The court was also concerned with color de-
pletion, finding there is a public interest in not unduly restrict-
ing the availability of colors for other traders of goods or 
services of the same type.122  Therefore, the graphic representa-
tion must be so clear and precise that it would always be per-
ceived unambiguously and uniformly.123 “Without this, the 
traders could not confidently identify the extent of third-party 
rights.”124 
Had the Louboutin case been decided in the European Un-
ion, the result would most likely mirror the Southern District’s 
decision in Louboutin.  Since a color sample alone would be in-
sufficient to satisfy the requirements of the Libertel court, 
Louboutin’s trademark would still be considered void. 
IV. HOW LAWS MAY BE ALTERED TO BETTER ACCOMMODATE 
COMMERCE 
It would be wise for the United States to adopt and require 
the European Union’s model of an internationally recognized 
color code in the process of trademark registration, rather than 
simply permitting the use of the color code.125  That way, uni-
formity may exist across the United States as well as the 
world.  Globalization is a reality that courts must recognize, 
since commerce and commercialization now live in a broader 
realm than simply the United States.  In an attempt to accom-
plish this goal, the United States entered into treaties with 
                                            
120 Heidelberger, ¶ 8. 
121 Roth, supra note 12, at 477 
122 Heidelberger, ¶ 41. 
123 Id.; see Make Your Mark: European Perspectives, JENKINS, http:// 
www.jenkins.eu/mym-autumn-2004/the-ecjs-recent-judgment.asp (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2012). 
124 Make Your Mark: European Perspectives, JENKINS, http:// 
www.jenkins.eu/mym-autumn-2004/the-ecjs-recent-judgment.asp (last visited 
Jan. 4, 2012). 
125 Either Pantone® Color Code, RGB Color Code, or RAL Color Code. 
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other countries, namely, the Madrid Protocol.126  The Madrid 
Protocol promotes efficiency and uniformity by ensuring 
trademark holders protection of their marks in multiple coun-
tries through the filing of one application with a single office, in 
one language, with one set of fees, in one currency.127   
While an International Registration may be issued, it remains 
the right of each country or contracting party designated for pro-
tection to determine whether or not protection for a mark may be 
granted. Once the trademark office in a designated country 
grants protection, the mark is protected in that country just as if 
that office had registered it. The Madrid Protocol also simplifies 
the subsequent management of the mark, since a simple, single 
procedural step serves to record subsequent changes in owner-
ship or in the name or address of the holder with World Intellec-
tual Property Organization's International Bureau. The Interna-
tional Bureau administers the Madrid System and coordinates 
the transmittal of requests for protection, renewals and other 
relevant documentation to all members.128 
Another international agreement entered into by the Unit-
ed States is the Paris Convention for the Protection of Intellec-
tual Property, one of the first intellectual property treaties.129  
It established a union for the protection of industrial property 
and attempted to harmonize trademark law and registration.130  
The initial objective of the convention was "the creation of a un-
ion which, without encroaching on the municipal law of the 
contracting countries, would lay down a number of general 
principles securing the interests of industrial property in the 
interior of a country as well as abroad."131   
                                            
126 See Madrid Protocol, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., http://www. 
uspto.gov/trademarks/law/madrid/index.jsp (last modified Sept. 19, 2012). 
127 Id. 
128 Id. 
129 See Treaties and Contracting Parties, WORLD INTELL. PROP. ORG.,  
http://www.wipo.int/treaties/en/ShowResults.jsp?country_id=ALL&start_year
=ANY&end_year=ANY&search_what=C&treaty_all=ALL (last visited Dec. 1, 
2012). The convention has 174 contracting parties, making it one of the most 
widely adopted treaties in the world. The Paris Convention is administered 
by the World Intellectual Property Association (WIPO). 
130 Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 
1883, 21 U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305. 
131 STEPHEN P. LADAS, PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, AND RELATED RIGHTS: 
NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION 63 (1975). 
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The primary issue with the aforementioned treaties is even 
though they attempt to promote uniformity of registration, they 
do not achieve uniformity in the outcome of the law.  The In-
ternational Trademark Association (INTA), a not-for-profit 
membership organization, has sought to do just that.132  INTA 
was founded in 1878 by 17 merchants and manufacturers who 
saw a need for an organization “to protect and promote the 
rights of trademark owners, to secure useful legislation and to 
give aid and encouragement to all efforts for the advancement 
and observance of trademark rights.”133  Today, 5,900 trade-
mark owners, professionals, and academics from over 190 coun-
tries comprise INTA’s powerful network.134  Headquartered in 
New York City, INTA has offices all over the world.135 
In 2005, INTA released the Model Free Trade Agreement 
(MFTA), which provides parties of Free Trade Agreements 
(FTA) with a set of baseline proposals to consider when negoti-
ating trademark-related provisions, which has been revised in 
2011 (2011 MFTA).136  The document attempts to “provide gov-
ernments and their trade negotiators with guidance for incor-
porating desirable trademark provisions into FTAs.”137  As the 
trend for international trade negotiations continues, the 
“INTA, through its 2011 MFTA seeks to contribute to the har-
monization of national laws with international treaties.”138  The 
provisions of the 2011 MFTA attempt to create “greater legal 
certainty as the level of protection of trademarks owners’ rights 
is raised.”139  As well, “trading partners will benefit equally as 
the new rights protection and enforcement mechanisms help 
create a more attractive investment climate for business, 
whether it is between two countries or within a regional mar-
                                            
132 See Overview, INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, http://www.inta.org/About/ 
Pages/Overview.aspx, (last visited Feb. 20, 2012). 
133 Id. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. 
136 INT’L TRADEMARK ASS’N, INTA MODEL FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 4 
(2011), available at http://www.inta.org/Advocacy/Documents/INTAModel 
FreeTradeAgreement.pdf. 
137 Id.   
138 Id. 
139 Id. 
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ket taking part in an FTA.”140  The 2011 MFTA seeks to unify 
member countries’ laws on the scope of trademark protection, 
registration procedures, notice of registration procedures, com-
parative advertising, licensing and assignment, automation of 
Trademark Office’s practice and procedures, term of trademark 
protection, Internet domain names, enforcement of trademark 
rights, administrative procedures and remedies, trademark 
owners’ right to access information, measures to cease transit 
of counterfeit goods, improvements in the international legal 
framework for criminal sanctions, and border measures tak-
en.141 
Currently, there exist countless treaties that do not begin 
to cover the breadth of information and legal guidance that the 
2011 MFTA seeks to include.  Furthermore, nontraditional 
marks, such as color, constantly evolve with technological ad-
vances and the laws must keep up with the market.  The 2011 
MFTA addresses these issues.  What the agreement does not 
address are the ways in which each member country would 
deal with these procedures.  Even though a trademark is regis-
trable according to the 2011 MFTA, that does not mean that 
each country will recognize the mark in the same way, or at all.  
For instance, would the European Union treat a color trade-
mark case involving fashion differently than one involving a 
construction business?  If Louboutin were decided in the Euro-
pean Union, would the result be the same?  Perhaps, but per-
haps not.  This is the central issue regarding trademark law 
and the broader category of intellectual property law.  Univer-
sal registration does not indicate or ensure uniform results, 
even though the treaties currently in place seek to create this 
consistency. 
Trademark law is complicated.  It forces courts to become 
arbiters of commercial industries in which, perhaps, they have 
no experience.142 In Louboutin, the Southern District of New 
York recognized that courts are routinely called upon to decide 
difficult questions in trademark disputes.143  Those questions 
may involve shades of differences in words, phrases, symbols, 
                                            
140 Id. 
141 See id. 
142 See Louboutin, 778 F. Supp. at 456. 
143 Id. 
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or colors.  With colors, distinctions in designs and ideas con-
veyed by single colors “represent not just matters of degree but 
much finer qualitative and aesthetic calls.”144  This logic not on-
ly applies to nontraditional marks, but to all trademarks for 
which knowledge of a particular market or industry is impera-
tive to making a proper determination.   
V. CONCLUSION 
Intellectual property law has become a specialized and 
globalized area of law that requires substantive and procedural 
specialty.145  Additionally, emerging technological issues and 
the development of e-commerce may redefine the role of the 
judge in a wide range of intellectual property cases.146  Intellec-
tual property is arguably one of the most rapidly evolving areas 
of law, and therefore, the need for a specialized system becomes 
increasingly urgent.147  Since focused courts will give judges the 
chance to deal mainly or exclusively with intellectual property 
disputes, they will create the opportunity to strengthen expert 
knowledge on the matter and, consequently, will shorten the 
length of the court’s procedure.148  
Perhaps it would be wise to introduce specialized courts to 
deal with intellectual property issues.  Judges could receive 
training in intellectual property issues or consult with experts 
who understand the intricacies associated with these matters.   
Another way to address this issue on a global level is to 
regulate intellectual property laws internationally.  Although 
this proposal would probably take years to implement, this in-
dustry is rapidly globalizing and registration treaties are the 
first step in the process of international regulation.  If a shoe 
designer cannot trademark his signature outsoles in the United 
States, he should not be allowed to trademark them in the Eu-
ropean Union, a market where the product is also sold.   
                                            
144 Id. 
145 See International Survey of Specialised Intellectual Property Courts 
and Tribunals, INT’L BAR ASS’N, http://www.ibanet.org/Search/Default. 
aspx?q=International Survey of Specialized Intellectual Property Courts and 
Tribunals, (last modified Oct. 20, 2011). 
146 Id. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
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Brands live internationally and, therefore, the courts must find 
a way to streamline commerce so businesses can accurately 
predict if their trademark registrations will be upheld in vari-
ous countries.   
Yet another way to encourage uniformity of intellectual 
property laws is to resolve these disputes through Alternative 
Dispute Resolution (ADR).   An international tribunal could be 
in charge of intellectual property disputes at the location where 
the mark or copyright holder has registered through an inter-
national treaty.  
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